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Since the be gin ning of the nu clear power gen er a tion, hu man per for mance has been a very im -
por  tant fac  tor in all phases of the plant lifecycle: de  sign, com  mis  sion  ing, op  er  a  tion, main  te  -
nance,  sur veil lance,  mod i fi ca tion,  and  de com mis sion ing.  This  as pect  has  been  con firmed  by
the op  er  at  ing ex  pe  ri  ence. A work  shop was or  ga  nized by the IAEA and the Joint Re  search
Cen  tre of the Eu  ro  pean Com  mis  sion, on Har  mo  ni  za  tion of low power and shutdown
probabilistic safety assessment for WWER nuclear power plants. One of the ma  jor ob jec  tives
of the Work shop was to pro vide a com par i son of the ap proaches and re sults of hu man re li abil -
ity anal y ses for WWER 440 and WWER 1000, and gain in sights for fu ture ap pli ca tion of hu -
man re  li  abil  ity anal  y  ses in Low Power and Shut  down sce  nar  ios. This pa  per pro  vides the in  -
sights  and  con clu sions  of  the  work shops  con cern ing  hu man  re li abil ity  anal y ses  and  hu man
fac tors.
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BACK GROUND
The risk cor  re  spond ing to Low Power and Shut -
down (LPSD) op  er  a  tion of WWER NPP is com  pa  ra  -
ble with the risk for at-power op  er  a  tion or even may
ex ceed it, as pointed out by many PSA stud ies. Hu man
fac  tors play a ma  jor role in the LPSD op  er  a  tions,
there  fore the main con  tri  bu  tors to the risk im  plied by
the LPSD op  er  a  tions are re  lated to hu  man fac  tors. By
means of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA),
weak  nesses re lated to hu  man per  for mance and hu man
fac tors can be iden ti fied and ap pro pri ate cor rec tive ac -
tions can be taken with the aim of fur  ther en  hanc  ing
nu clear  safety.
The hu man re li abil ity anal y sis of PSA for LPSD
states has to con sider spe cific fea tures that may be dif -
fer  ent from those of the hu  man re  li  abil  ity anal  y  ses
(HRA) per  formed for at-power PSA. These fea  tures
may im pact both the op  er  a  tors’ work and on the meth  -
ods, and in clude: dif fer ent time win dows avail able for
op er a tors  to  mit i gate  con se quences,  the  level  of  de tail
and com  plete  ness of the pro  ce  dures used dur  ing shut  -
down,  more  re quire ments  for  man ual  ma nip u la tions
with plant equip  ment in re  sponse to ini  ti  at  ing event
due to un  avail  abil  ity of some emer  gency in  ter  locks,
and  very  strong  in ter ac tion  be tween  hu man-in duced
ini ti a tors  and  sub se quent  op er a tor  re sponse.
In 2007, the IAEA launched a Re  gional tech  ni  -
cal  co-op er a tion  (TC)  Pro ject  RER9087  Har mo ni za -
tion of PSA & PSA Ap  pli  ca  tions.  In the frame  work
of the above pro ject, the IAEA or ga nized in co-op er a -
tion with the In  sti  tute for En  ergy of the Joint Re  -
search Cen  ter of the Eu  ro  pean com  mis  sion (JRC-IE)
a work  shop on Har  mo  ni  za  tion of Low Power and
Shut down  Proba bil is tic  Safety  As sess ment  for
WWER Nu  clear Power Plants. One of the key top  ics
was the anal  y  sis of the im  pact of hu  man fac  tors on
NPP safety. In par tic u lar, the work shop, with spe cific
fo cus  on  hu man  re li abil ity,  aimed  at  con tin u ing  the
work on har  mo  ni  za  tion of PSA for WWER-type nu  -
clear power plants for LPSD states that was started at
the first work  shop held at the same place in March
2007. More de  tails con  cern  ing the re  sults of the
work  shops, and the dom  i  nant hu  man er  rors iden  ti  -
fied in the dif  fer  ent PSA re  lated to WWER re  ac  tors
are given in the re ports of the work shops [1, 2] and in
a pre  vi  ous pa  per of the au  thors [3].
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For col  lect  ing the data needed for the pur  poses
of the Work  shop, a ques  tion  naire was de  vel  oped and
sent to the par  tic  i  pants. The ques  tion  naire aimed at
col lect ing  de tailed  in for ma tion  on  ini ti at ing  events
fre quen cies,  hu man  er rors,  and  mod el ing  de tails  for
six se  lected ini  ti  a  tors for WWER-440 and
WWER-1000  plants.  The  se lected  ini ti a tors  rep re sent
the ma  jor con  tri  bu  tors to the core dam  age fre  quency
(CDF) in PSA stud  ies for re  spec  tive WWER plant
units. These have been iden  ti fied at the first work shop
[2].  The  se lected  ini ti a tors  were:
WWER-440: WWER-1000:
(1) Human-induced loss of
.... coolant accident  
.....(LOCA)
(1) Loss of offsite power
......(LOOP)
(2) Loss of non-essential .... 
......service water
(2) Heavy load drops on 
......primary circuit (into the
......reactor)
(3) Reactivity accidents ... 
......including boron
/////dilution
(3) Primary circuit leaks outside 
......containment
(4) Loss of natural
......circulation
(4) Small LOCA from primary
......to secondary circuit
(5) Heavy load drops (5) Loss of heat removal from
......reactor core via primary side
(6) Small LOCA
     20-60 mm
(6) Primary leaks via pressurizer 
......safety valves after opening
......during hydrotest
Eleven com  pleted ques  tion  naires were re  ceived
form  the  par tic i pants  rep re sent ing  dif fer ent  NPP  as
pre  sented in tab. 1.
The orig i nal re sponses can be found in An nex III 
of ref [1]. Dur  ing the Work  shop, the col  lected data
were  pro cessed  in  the  PSA  com par i son  ac tiv i ties
which were car ried out by two work ing groups (WG):
– WG 1, which car ried out the com par i son and har mo -
ni  za  tion of LPSD PSA for WWER-440 NPP, and
– WG 2, which car  ried out the com  par  i  son and har  -
mo ni za tion of LPSD PSA for WWER-1000 NPP.
For both groups of WWER NPP the fol  low  ing
in for ma tion was col lected for six ini ti a tors rec og nized
to be the ma  jor source of dif  fer  ences in the risk pro  -
files:
– con  tri  bu  tion to the to  tal CDF for the ini  ti  a  tors
[1, 2],
– twenty TOP min  i  mal cut sets (MCSs)
**, and
– human er  rors (HE) mod  eled.
Sev  eral main ar  eas of anal  y  sis were cov  ered in
the dis  cus  sions car  ried out in the work  ing groups [1];
in par  tic  u  lar, the achieve  ment of in  sights on re  sults
and  spe cific  fea tures  of  Hu man  Re li abil ity  Anal y sis
for PSA for LPSD states. While do  ing the com par  i  son
ex er cise,  the  de sign  dif fer ences  were  an a lyzed  and
taken into ac  count, as well as the fact that the orig  i  nal
de  signs were not iden  ti  cal.
OVER  VIEW OF THE METH  ODS
FOR  THE  HRA  QUAN TI FI CA TION 
Dur  ing the work  shop, the em  pha  sis was put on
the  com par i son  of  the  meth od ol o gies  used  for  hu man
re li abil ity anal y sis in the LPSD PSAs for WWER-440
NPPs, in par  tic  u  lar for what con  cerns the quan  ti  fi  ca  -
tion of the prob  a  bil  ity of oc  cur  rence of hu  man fail  ure
events. An over  view of the meth  od  ol  o  gies is pre  -
sented  in  tab.  2  (Ad di tional  in for ma tion  con cern ing
the ta  ble can be found in ref  er  ence 1).
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Ta  ble 1. Over  view of Plants Con  trib  ut  ing to the Ques  tion  naire
on LPSD PSA
Country Plant Basic design
WWER-1000 NPP
Bulgaria Kozloduy NPP units 5, 6 V-320
Russia Kalinin NPP unit 2 V-338 (small series)
Russia Novovoronezh NPP unit 5 V-187 (small series)
Ukraine Rivne NPP unit 4 V-320
Ukraine Khmelnytsky NPP unit 2 V-320
WWER-440 NPP
Bulgaria Kozloduy NPP units 3, 4
* V-209M
Upgraded model of
V-230
Czech
republic Dukovany NPP unit 1 V-213
Hungary Paks NPP units 1-4 V-213
Slovakia Bohunice V-1 unit 2 V-230
Slovakia Bohunice V-2 unit 3 V-213
Slovakia Mochovce NPP unit 1 V-213
*The plant units are shut down of De  cem  ber 31, 2006
**A min  i mal cut set is a com  bi na tion of an ini  ti at ing event and com -
po nent fail ures and/or hu man er rors that could lead to un de sir able
con se quences  (e.  g. core dam  age). It means that: (1) the given
com  bi  na  tion of events would cause core dam  age, and (2) if any
event is se lected and elim i nated from the min i mum cut set, the re -
main  ing sub  set of events does not cause core dam  age any  more.
Each MCS has a fre  quency as  sessed by PSA tech  nique.
Ta ble 2. Meth od ol o gies used for anal y sis and quan ti fi ca tion 
of  hu man  er ror  prob a bil ity  (HEP)  for  the  in di vid ual
cat e go ries  of  hu man  ac tions
Plant
Type of human failure event
Pre-accident Initiator Post-accident
Armenian 2 THERP
[4, 5] ... (
***) HCR [6],
ASEP
Bohunice V-1 THERP THERP, ASEP TRC, THERP
Bohunice V-2 THERP THERP, ASEP TRC, THERP 
Dukovany THERP
THERP,
CREAM [7],
HEART [8],
Decision trees
Decision trees
+ ASEP
Mochovce THERP,
ASEP [9] THERP, ASEP SLIM [10]
Paks ASEP Decision trees Decision trees
Kozloduy
NPP Units 3,4 THERP Information
not available HCR
***     Since the in  for  ma  tion has been taken from full power PSA,
     no hu man in duced ini ti a tors were iden ti fied and no spe cific HRA
...method was deemed nec  es  sary there  fore for this part of HRAWith ref  er  ence to tab. 2, the fol  low  ing con  sid  er  -
ations emerge. A set of dif  fer  ent HRA quan  ti  fi  ca  tion
meth  ods was used by the in  di  vid  ual teams. In to  tal
seven meth  ods had been used, if it is con  sid  ered TRC
and HCR to be the same. The THERP method is the
most pop  u  lar in the con  sid  ered anal  y  ses; ASEP fol  -
lows as sec ond. Be  cause ASEP can be seen as a short  -
ened and up-dated ver  sion of THERP,  THERP/ASEP
were iden ti fied as the most used HRA meth  ods for an  -
a lyz ing  hu man  er rors  oc cur ring  in  the  pre-ac ci dent
phase. TRC (HCR) is the most pop  u  lar method for
post-ac ci dent  hu man  er rors  anal y sis.
SPE CIFIC  IN SIGHTS  RE GARD ING
HRA IN LPSD PSA 
This sec tion is di vided into two parts. In the first
one, some gen  eral com  ments about LPSD HRA are
made. In the sec  ond, some con  clu  sions are pre  sented,
based on the anal  y  sis of the ques  tion  naires pro  vided
by the teams in volved into the har mo ni za tion ef fort for 
the PSA for WWER plants.
Gen  eral considerations on LPSD HRA
The first com ment stem ming from the work shop
is that the role of plant crew dur  ing low power and
shut down  op er a tion  and,  con se quently,  the  im por -
tance of HRA for the LPSD of an in te grated plant PSA
model is even higher than in case of full power op  er  a  -
tion. This is sum ma rized in tab. 3, which shows the im -
por  tance of dif  fer  ent types of hu  man er  rors.
The im por tance of hu man ac tions for LPSD PSA 
of WWER re  ac  tors can also be con  sid  ered with re  -
spect to the plant crew role in the most fre quently an  a -
lyzed LPSD ac ci dent sce nar ios. The high in volve ment 
of plant staff in these sce nar ios is pointed out by tab. 4.
The prob  lem of LPSD HRA is that the en  hanced
role of hu  man fac  tors in LPSD ac  ci  dent con  di  tions
can not  be  sup ported  with  ad e quately  de vel oped  spe -
cific  HRA  meth od ol o gies.  The  po ten tial  of  HRA
meth od ol o gies  to  ad e quately  sup port  the  anal y sis  of
spe cific types of hu man er rors is sum ma rized in tab. 5. 
Some other spe cific as pects of HRA anal y sis can 
be also in  ferred by com  par  ing full power and LPSD
PSA. These com  par  i  sons are sum  ma  rized in tab. 6.
The gen  eral con  di  tions of crew work dur  ing
plant LPSD sta  tus have to be ad  dressed ad  e  quately in
LPSD HRA. In tab. 7, an over view of ba sic cat e go ries
of plant states dur  ing LPSD pe  riod of op  er  a  tion is
given.  Dif fer ent  Hu man  Er ror  Prob a bil i ties  (HEPs)
are de  rived for even the same hu  man ac  tions, when
car  ried out un  der the dif  fer  ent cir  cum  stances and dif  -
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Ta  ble 3. Im  por  tance of dif  fer  ent types of hu  man errors
HE category Full power PSA Low power PSA
Pre-accident Low Low
Contributing to
initiating events Very low High
Post-accident High High
Recoveries Medium High
Ta ble  4.  Hu man  re lated  sce nar ios  con trib ut ing  to  the
ini ti at ing  event  oc cur rence  dur ing  LPSD  op er a tion  of
WWER reactors
Scenario
Plant crew role in
the initiation part of
the scenario
Plant crew role in
the response part of
the scenario
Interruption of
RHR circuit
coolant flow
Almost completely
caused by human
actions
Important
Drainage of RHR
circuit coolant
Almost completely
caused by human
actions
Important
Loss of natural
circulation due to
steam bubble
Partially Critical
Loss of natural
circulation due to
primary circuit
drainage
Completely caused
by human actions Important
Inadvertent closing 
of main isolation
valves
Completely caused
by human actions
Important, although
playing relatively
simple role
Man-induced
LOCA
Completely caused
by human actions Very important
Reactivity
transients
Depending on
cases, may be
crucial, may be
unimportant
Important
Primary circuit
cold
over-pressurization
Completely caused
by human actions Important
Ta ble  5.  Po ten tial  of  cur rent  meth od ol o gies  for  anal y sis
of hu  man ac  tion categories
Human failure type Full power PSA Low power PSA
Pre-accident Medium Medium
Contributing to
initiating events (IE) Almost irrelevant Medium
Post-accident Relatively high Relatively low
Recoveries Low to medium Unclear
Human failure type Full power PSA Low power PSA
Altogether Medium to high Low to medium
Ta ble 6. Some com par i sons be tween full power HRA and
shut  down HRA attributes
Attribute Full power PSA Low power PSA
Dependence
analysis
Strong dependencies 
among human
actions in one
accident sequence
typical
Less strong
dependencies
(long time,
successive actions,
change of crew,
additional members
of accident team)
Errors
commission Potentially important Very important
Expert
judgment use Medium Medium to high
Revision phase Difficult Very difficult
Relative
uncertainty Medium Highfer  ent plant states. The anal  y  sis of the most com  mon
HRA meth  ods may dif  fer for full-power and LPSD
anal y sis  sig nif i cantly.  Some  meth ods  that  are  quite
suit able for full-power anal y sis may not ad dress LPSD 
con di tions suf fi ciently,  whilst oth ers  may pro vide  sat -
is  fac  tory or good re  sults. In ad  di  tion, in tab. 8, sev  eral
com ments  con cern ing  the  ap pli ca bil ity  of  dif fer ent
HRA meth ods for LPSD study are sum ma rized and re -
ferred to five typologies of hu  man ac  tions.
DIS CUS SION 
Some spe  cific in  sights re  gard  ing HRA in LPSD
PSA have been gained on the ba  sis of com  par  i  son of
the  re sults  re lated  to  hu man  re li abil ity  anal y sis  pro -
vided by the in  di  vid  ual plants in the ques  tion  naires
(see An nex III of ref. [1]). The com par i son of the ba sic
fea  tures of HRA per  formed within the in  di  vid  ual
WWER PSA is given in tabs. 9 and 10, one ta  ble for
WWER-440 re  ac  tors and the other for WWER-1000
re ac tors.  The  WWER-440  ta ble  cov ers  in for ma tion
about HRA for six NPPs; the WWER-1000 ta ble is de -
voted to HRA in for ma tion taken from five NPP. A few
plants did not pro vide de tailed in for ma  tion, be  cause it
was ei  ther not avail  able or the LPSD study was not fi  -
nal ized  yet.
In the ta  bles, six se  lected emer  gency sce  nar  ios
are de  fined, which were eval  u  ated as most im  por  tant
from the point of view of the LPSD PSA re  sults con  -
cern  ing WWER re  ac  tors. Some of the sce  nar  ios are
the same for both types of re ac tors, some are dif fer ent.
Some sce nar ios had been found not to have sig nif i cant
im pact on the PSA re sults for spe cific plants, which as
a con  se  quence have not been cov  ered with the cor  re  -
spond ing PSA. In this spe  cific case, the note “not pro  -
vided” or “screened out” is in  serted in the ta  bles.
Ev ery  plant  spe cific  HRA  in for ma tion  con sists
of five items:
– “HEP range” – for ev ery sce nario, it is the range of 
HEP quan  ti  fy  ing the hu  man ac  tions which are
mod eled as part of the tech no log i cal and or ga ni za -
tional pro cesses form ing the sce nario. This cou ple 
of pa  ram  e  ters can give some in  sights about the
con  ser  va  tism of the HRA study un  der con  sid  er  -
ation. How  ever the used HEP  can  not be taken as
an  ab so lute in di ca tor, be cause the level of con ser -
va  tism is re  flected both in HEP val  ues and in the
ap  proach used in the de  vel  op  ment of the sce  nario
model,
– “HEP range typ i cal” – the ba sis for this pa ram e ter is 
given in the pre  vi  ous row, but some fairly ex  cep  -
tional HEP val  ues, from the set of all HEP val  ues
for the given sce  nario, are not taken into con  sid  er  -
ation. Some  times, the “HEP range” pa  ram  e  ter is
not a good re flec tion of the scope of most of the val -
ues, be  cause there is a cou  ple of non-typ  i  cal HEP
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Ta  ble 7. Five ar  eas of hu  man ac  tions in LPSD PSA
Area Conditions for crew
work From-to
Area 1 – Plant
within the early
stage of going to
shut down status
Similar or at least
similar to nominal
power, dynamic
changes in parameter 
values
From nominal
power operation to
initiation of residual
heat removal (RHR) 
cooling
Area 2 – Plant at 
the end stage of
going to shut
down status
Significantly
different from
nominal power,
dynamic changes,
short period
From initiation of
RHR cooling to start 
of reactor cover
removal
Area 3 –  Plant
within the first
part of shut
down
Shut down specifics,
medium dynamic,
relatively long period
From the start of
reactor cover
removal to the start
of fuel exchange
Area 4 – Plant in 
late shut down
Very long time
windows for crew
corrective actions,
low residual heat
From fuel exchange
to the start of unit
power-up
Area 5 – Plant
during start-up
Basically similar to
AREA 2, but specific 
features must be
addressed
From the start of
unit power-up to
niminal power
Ta ble 8. Com par i son of quan ti fi ca tion meth ods ap pli ca bil ity 
for full power and LPSD HRA
Method Conclusions
Absolute
probability
judgment
In LPSD PSA, the suitability of the method
is even higher, considering that the
application of “classic” methods may imply 
some problems
Time vs.
reliability
correlation
(HCR)
Limited applicability, particularly in shut
down scenarios. Often producing unrealistic 
and too low long time windows HEP
THERP, ASEP
Suitable for selected categories of actions,
similarly to full power PSA (actions
explicitly given in procedures, with low
level of cognition, or local actions)
Decision trees
Good applicability in general, but not a very 
good transferability from full power PSA.
Special decision trees may need to be
developed for LPSD PSA applications
HEART
Similarly to full power PSA, the method
may help in analyzing specific actions
difficult to be processed with other
methods. The method does should not be
used as standalone HRA method
Simulator data,
bayesian update
Limited applicability because a significant part
of initiating event response activities may be
performed out of the control room.
Consequently, many important crew tasks
related to low power operation and shut down
are not covered by the training at full scope
simular. The problem of simulator fidelity is
even higher in case of the LPSD status
Generic data
Very limited applicability due to the highly
plant specific character of measures
preventing and responding to LPSD PSA
accident scenarios
SLIM
Good applicability potential, provided that
the time related issues are treated
adequately. The method is one of the
available good choices for LPSD PSA
CREAM
Very helpful when the cognition part of
human actions must be taken into account
(e. g. for the circumstances when the
procedural support is missing and
improvisation needed). Good choice for full 
power as well as LPSD PSAG. Manna, et al.: Hu  man Re  li  abil  ity Anal  y  sis in Low Power and Shut-down ...
Nu  clear Tech  nol  ogy & Ra  di  a  tion Pro  tec  tion: Year 2012, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 189-197 193
Ta  ble 9. Re  sults of anal  y  sis of HRA re  lated in  for  ma  tion pro  vided in the questionnares de  vel  oped for WWER-440 NPP
WWER-440
reactors
Scenario 1 – man
induced LOCA
(MIL)
Scenario 2 – loss
of operational
(non-essential)
service water
(LOSW)
Scenario 3 –
reactivity accidents
Scenario 4 –
loss of natural
circulation
Scenario 5 –
heavy load drops
Scenario 6 –
small LOCA
Plant 1
LPSD not finished yet
Plant 2
HEP range 5×10
–5-1.4×10
–2 5×10
–5-2.5×10
–2
Not provided
5×10
–5-1.4×10
–2
Not provided
5×10
–5-5×10
–2
HEP range
typical 5×10
–5-5×10
–5 5×10
–5-2.5×10
–2 5×10
–5-1.4×10
–2 5×10
–5-4×10
–4
HE absolute
CDF 1.33×10
–6 5.1×10
–7 1.43×10
–6 5.1×10
–8
HE relative
CDF 0.29 0.85 0.66 0.046
LER Not available Not available Not available Not available
Plant 3
HEP range 4×10
–3-2×10
–1
Screened out
4×10
–3-6×10
–2 8×10
–4-2×10
–1 4×10
–6-5×10
–6 2.5×10
–3-3×10
–1
HEP range
typical 1×10
–2-7×10
–2 1×10
–2-6×10
–2 5×10
–3-8×10
–2 4×10
–6-5×10
–6 1.75×10
–2-1×10
–1
HE absolute
CDF 1.7×10
–6 8.5×10
–8 8.5×10
–6 6.8×10
–6 5.17×10
–6
HE relative
CDF 1 1 1 0.89 0.99
LER 0.59 0.84 0.90 0.86 1
Plant 4
Information not provided
Plant 5
HEP range 2.5×10
–5-5×10
–1
Screened out
8.36×10
–6-1.83×10
–3 5.27×10
–4-4.35×10
–1 3×10
–2-6.59×10
–1 4×10
–3-2×10
–1
HEP range
typical 2.5×10
–5-5.6×10
–2 8.36×10
–6-1.20×10
–4 2.0×10
–3-4.35×10
–1 3×10
–2-2.64×10
–1 4×10
–3-2.64×10
–1
HE absolute
CDF 6.48×10
–7 1.7×10
–6 1.70×10
–7 1.95×10
–8 1.34×10
–8
HE relative
CDF 0.96 1 1 0.07 0.955
LER 0.3 0.98 0.62 0.91 0.29
Plant 6
HEP range 1.2×10
–4-1.2×10
–4 1.2×10
–4-5×10
–1 1×10
–5-1 1.2×10
–4-3.6×10
–3
Not analyzed
1.18×10
–4
HEP range
typical 1.2×10
–4-1.2×10
–4 1.2×10
–4-5×10
–3 1×10
–5, 1.44×10
–1 1.2×10
–4-2.6×10
–4 1.18×10
–4
HE absolute
CDF 5.86×10
–6 1.7×10
–6 2.97×10
–7 1.05×10
–5 6.11×10
–10
HE relative
CDF 0.108 0.49 0.996 0.87 0.009
LER 0.63 0.71 0.96 0.96 0.88
Plant 7
HEP range 2.1×10
–5-5×10
–2
Screened out
1×10
–5-1 1×10
–5-1×10
–5
Not analyzed
1×10
–5-5.2×10
–5
HEP range
typical 5.9×10
–4-5×10
–2 1×10
–5-5×10
–2 1×10
–5-1×10
–5 1×10
–5-5.2×10
–5
HE absolute
CDF Not at disposal 1.38×10
–6 1.1×10
–7 Negligible
HE relative
CDF Not at disposal 1 0.079 Close to 0
LER 0.42 Not at disposal 0.89 0.013
Plant 8
HEP range 4.12×10
–4-2×10
–2 2.5×10
–5-1.8×10
–2 2.5×10
–4-6.34×10
–3 1.39×10
–4-2.6×10
–3 To be specified 4.92×10
–4
HEP range
typical 4.12×10
–4-2×10
–2 1.16×10
–3-1.8×10
–2 2.5×10
–4-6.34×10
–3 1.39×10
–4-2.6×10
–3 To be specified 4.92×10
–4
HE absolute
CDF 2.71×10
–6 1.77×10
–8 1.16×10
–9 2.21×10
–6-1.19×10
–8 To be specified 2.4×10
–9
HE relative
CDF 1 0.48 1 0.99 To be specified 0.13
LER 0.996 1 0.94 1, 1 To be specified 0.69val  ues fall  ing sig  nif  i  cantly out of the “nor  mal
range”. The aim of the “HEP range typ  i  cal” is to
elim i nate  these  “re mote  ob ser va tions”  and  to  get
more pre  cise pat  tern of the HEPs used,
– “HE ab so lute core damage frequency (CDF)” – To -
tal con  tri  bu  tion of fre  quen  cies of all those min  i  -
mum cut sets (MCS), be  long  ing to the given sce  -
nario of the PSA model that con tains the ba sic event 
rep re sent ing the hu man fail ure in ques tion. This in -
for ma tion  is  suit able  for  com par i son  of  ab so lute
im  pact of hu  man-fac  tor is  sues spe  cific for the
given sce  nario on the eval  u  ated risk,
– “HE  rel a tive  CDF”  –  rel a tive  con tri bu tion  of  fre -
quen  cies of all those min  i  mum cut sets (be  long  ing
to the given sce  nario PSA model) that con  tain fail  -
ure of some hu  man ac  tions, i. e.  to tal  con tri bu tion
of the hu  man er  ror (HE) ab  so  lute CDF di  vided by
the to  tal sum of the first twenty MCS CDF con  tri  -
bu  tions. In this way it is pos  si  ble to see which part
of risk con  nected with se  lected sce  nario has some
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Ta ble 10. Re sults of anal y sis of HRA re lated in for ma tion pro vided in the ques tion naires de vel oped for WWER-1000 NPP
WWER-1000 
reactors
Scenario 1 – loss
of offsite power
Scenario 2 – heavy 
load drops
Scenario 3 –
primary circuit
leaks outside
containment
Scenario 4 –
small LOCA
primary to
secondary
Scenario 5 –
loss of heat
removal via
primary side
Scenario 6 –
pressurizer safety
valve (PSV) primary 
leaks during
hydro-test
Plant 9
HEP range 8×10
–3-1.6×10
–1
Not analyzed
1×10
–5-1.3×10
–3 2.7×10
4-1.6×10
–2 2.13×10
–4-2.3×10
–2
Not considered
HEP range
typical 8×10
–3-1.6×10
–1 8×10
–4-1.3×10
–3 2.7×10
4-1.6×10
–2 8×10
–3-2.3×10
–2
HE absolute
CDF 1.06×10
–6 1.26×10
–6 1.03×10
–6 2.74×10
–6
HE relative
CDF 0.22 1 1 0.36
LER 0.39 0.81 0.8 0.29
Plant 10
Information not provided
Plant 11
HEP range No HE No HE 1×10
–3 1×10
–4-2×10
–3 1×10
–4-1×10
–4 No HE
HEP range
typical No HE No HE 1×10
–3 5×10
–4-2×10
–3 1×10
–4-1×10
–4 No HE
HE absolute
CDF 0 0 4.89×10
–12 6.9×10
–8 3.7×10
–7 0
HE relative
CDF 0 0 0.82 0.98 0.31 0
LER 1 1 1 1 0.6 1
Plant 12
HEP range 6.2×10
–4-8.8×10
–2 No HE 2.4×10
–2-2.4×10
–2 1×10
–4-4.86×10
–2 No HE 1.4×10
–3-3.7×10
–3
HEP range
typical 1.2×10
–3-6.6×10
–2 No HE 2.4×10
–2-2.4×10
–2 1.9×10
–3-4.86×10
–2 No HE 1.4×10
–3-3.7×10
–3
HE absolute
CDF 3.06×10
–6 0 2.43×10
–6 7.8×10
–8 0 1.9×10
–8
HE relative
CDF 0.24 0 0.66 1 0 0.02
LER 0.33 1 0.91 0.99 1 0.97
Plant 13
HEP range 2.3×10
–3-2.9×10
–2 6.8×10
–3-1.5×10
–2 4×10
–3-1.5×10
–1 2.4×10
–3-1.5×10
–1 4.8×10
–3-1.2×10
–2 6.8×10
–3-2.9×10
–2
HEP range
typical 2.3×10
–3-2.9×10
–2 6.8×10
–3-1.5×10
–2 4×10
–3-4.9×10
–2 2.4×10
–3-6.8×10
–2 4.8×10
–3-6.8×10
–3 6.8×10
–3-1.5×10
–2
HE absolute
CDF 6.3×10
–8 9.4×10
–6 1.37×10
–6 3×10
–6 1.7×10
–6 1.07×10
–5
HE relative
CDF 0.14 0.96 1 1 1 1
LER 0.21 0.94 0.96 0.21 1 1
Plant 14
HEP range 1.5×10
–2-1.5×10
–2 2.3×10
–3-1.5×10
–2 2.4×10
–3-1.5×10
–1 4×10
–3-1.5×10
–1 6.7×10
–4-1.5×10
–2 2.35×10
–3-2.86×10
–2
HEP range
typical 1.5×10
–2-1.5×10
–2 2.3×10
–3-1.5×10
–2 2.4×10
–3-4.9×10
–2 4×10
–3-1.5×10
–1 1.2×10
–2-1.5×10
–2 2.35×10
–3-2.86×10
–2
HE absolute
CDF 1.26×10
–7 5.26×10
–6 1.09×10
–5 1.11×10
–5 2.06×10
–7 7.66×10
–6
HE relative
CDF 0.15 0.91 1 1 1 0.99
LER 0.4 0.55 0.78 0.79 0.15 0.98re  la  tion with hu  man fac  tor prob  lems: small val  ues
of this pa  ram  e  ter in  di  cate that the re  sponse to the
given ini ti at ing event is per formed mostly au to mat -
i  cally, with  out in  volve  ment of plant crew (what
should not be the case for WWER NPP), and
– “Level  or  rep re sen ta tive ness  (LER)”  –  to tal  con tri -
bu  tion to CDF com  ing from the first twenty MCS
re  lated to the given sce  nario di  vided by the to  tal
CDF value de  rived for the sce  nario (com  ing from
“all” sce nario MCS). LER shows, how much rep re -
sen  ta  tive are the pre  vi  ous re  sults pre  sented in the
ta  ble, ob  tained on the base of the twenty most im  -
por  tant min  i  mum cut sets only, if the value is close
to 1, where the first twenty MCS rep  re  sent al  most
all the sce  nario risk.
A large quan  tity of in  for  ma  tion is pre  sented in
the ta  bles. For the in  di  vid  ual at  trib  utes, the range val  -
ues are the fol  low  ing:
HEP range val  ues
– ex  tremely low – of mag  ni  tude 10
–6
– very low – of mag  ni  tude 10
–5
– low – of mag  ni  tude 10
–4
– me  dium – of mag  ni  tude 10
–3
– fairly high – of mag  ni  tude 10
–2
– very high – of mag  ni  tude 10
–1
Note 1: Low HEP val  ues are de  sir  able, high val  -
ues un  de  sir  able. How  ever, low HEP val  ues may also
be due to the pres  ence of some bias in the anal  y  sis. 
HE  ab so lute  CDF
– very low – of mag  ni  tude 10
–8 and lower
– low – of mag  ni  tude 10
–7
– me  dium – of mag  ni  tude 10
–6
– high – of mag  ni  tude 10
–5 and higher
Note 1 holds for this case, as well.
HE  rel a tive  CDF
– very low – lower than or equal to 0.1
– low – from the in  ter  val (0.1, 0.4>)
– me  dium – from the in  ter  val (0.4, 0.7>)
– high – from the in  ter  val (0.7, 1>)
Note 2: High val  ues of this pa  ram  e  ter are ex  -
pected, low val  ues are seen as ab  nor  mal.
LER
The same rules are used as for “HE rel  a  tive
CDF”  at trib ute.
Note 3: High val  ues of this pa  ram  e  ter in  di  cate
higher cred  i  bil  ity of anal  y  sis re  sults and vice versa.
Us  ing tabs. 9 and 10, two kinds of use  ful com  -
par i sons  can  be  ba si cally  made:
– the  com par i son  of  the  pa ram e ters  be tween  dif fer -
ent plants for the same sce  nario, and
– the  com par i son  of  the  pa ram e ters   be tween  dif fer -
ent sce  nar  ios for the same plant.
The fol  low  ing con  clu  sions can be made on the
ba sis of the ta ble for the LPSD HRA (across sce nar ios) 
for the in  di  vid  ual WWER-440 plants:
– the HEP val  ues used in Plant 2 PSA are the most
op  ti  mis  tic ones among all the val  ues pro  vided by
the plants; in gen  eral, the risk con  tri  bu  tion for hu  -
man fac  tors re  lated is  sues is rel  a  tively low and a
rel a  tively sig  nif  i  cant part of MCS (for most of the
sce  nar  ios) does not con  tain hu  man fail  ures,
– the HEP range typ  i  cal for Plant 3 NPP HRA is
rather con  ser  va  tive, ex  cept for heavy load drops,
whilst  the rel  a  tive part of risk con  tri  bu  tion con  -
nected with sce nario seg ments con trolled with hu -
man ac  tions is rather high,
– some HEP val  ues used in Plant 5 HRA are highly
con ser va tive,  but  still  ad e quate,  be cause  the  level
of risk con  tri  bu  tion re  lated to hu  man fac  tors  is
quite low in those cases; the rel  a  tive con  tri  bu  tion
to the risk level ex pected to be high (big in  flu  ence
of hu  man fac  tor) with an ex  cep  tion re  gard  ing
heavy load drops,
– the HEP val ues in Plant 6 PSA study are rel a tively
low in most sce  nar  ios taken into con  sid  er  ation;
how  ever, the ab  so  lute hu  man re  lated risk con  tri  -
bu tion is fairly high in sev eral sce nar ios an a lyzed;
a very low (both ab  so  lute and rel  a  tive) con  tri  bu  -
tion of hu  man ac  tions is typ  i  cal for small LOCA
sce nar ios,
– for Plant 7, the con  clu  sions re  gard  ing HEPs
ranges  and  hu man  fac tor  ab so lute  con tri bu tion  to
the risk con  nected with the sce  nar  ios un  der con  -
cern are quite close to the con  clu  sions made for
Plant 6, with one sig  nif  i  cant dif  fer  ence in the
value  of  rel a tive  con tri bu tion  of  hu man  re lated
seg  ments to the sce  nario “Loss of nat  u  ral cir  cu  la  -
tion”, and
– in the LPSD PSA of Plant 8 some HEP ranges are
ex  pected in typ  i  cal up-to-date PSA; some ranges
are rel  a  tively low, lead  ing to lower to  tal con  tri  bu  -
tion of the cor re spond ing sce nar ios to LPSD op er -
a  tion risk; the val  ues of rel  a  tive hu  man re  lated
con tri bu tors are rather close to unity, which points
out the high rel e vance of hu man fac tors in the sce -
nar  ios, with an ex  cep  tion in the case of small
LOCA.
For the HRA de  vel  oped for plants with
WWER-1000  re ac tors,  the  fol low ing  gen eral  con clu -
sions are made:
– rather con  ser  va  tive HEP val  ues are used in gen  -
eral for Plant 9 HRA, lead ing to rel a tive bal anced,
sig nif i cant  to tal  con tri bu tions  of  hu man  parts  of
all se  lected sce  nar  ios to plant risk; however, the
rel a tive  hu man  re lated  con tri bu tions  are  small  for
the sce  nar  ios “loss of off-site power” and “loss of
heat re  moval”,
– in the case of Plant 11, the HEP val  ues used are
rather op ti mis tic (typ i cal val ues which can be used 
for lon ger time win dows), but the ab so lute hu man
re lated con tri bu tions to plant risk have been found 
to be very low; because the rel  a  tive weight of
these con  tri  bu  tors was spec  i  fied as high, the rea  -
son can not be in  com  plete  ness of hu  man fac  tor
part in the mod el ing; moreover, it is worth to men -
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half of the sce  nar  ios,
– rather high HEP are used in gen  eral in Plant 12 
HRA, but still keep  ing low the val  ues of most of
the  con tri bu tions  of  hu man  re lated  MCS,
– in Plant 13  HRA, the val ues of HEP are very high
and the val  ues of ab  so  lute and rel  a  tive con  tri  bu  -
tion of hu  man re  lated parts of the in  di  vid  ual sce  -
nar  ios to plant risk are – prob  a  bly as a di  rect con  -
se quence – rather high as well. The only ex cep tion 
is the sce  nario “loss of off-site power” with high
HEP val ues, but a quite low to tal as well as rel a tive 
con  tri  bu  tion to plant LPSD risk, and
– fi nally, for Plant 14 HRA, a very sim i lar spec trum of
pa ram e ter val  ues can be found as for Plant 13 HRA,
and,  con se quently,  very  sim i lar  con clu sions  can  be
made about the level of con  ser  va  tive  ness as well as
of  hu man  re li abil ity  im por tance  for  PSA  re sults.
CON CLU SIONS
The  fol low ing  con clu sions  stem  from  com par i -
sons from the point of view of the in di vid ual sce nar ios
across plants.
· In gen  eral, it is dif  fi  cult to iden  tify some spe  cific
fea tures  of  the  in di vid ual  sce nar ios  re gard ing
HEP val  ues used in cor  re  spond  ing HRA. The
whole spec  trum of HEP ranges can be usu  ally
iden  ti  fied across plants, some ex  cep  tion from this
con clu sion are noted for the WWER-1000 sce nar -
ios “Loss of heat re  moval via pri  mary side” and
“PSV pri  mary leaks dur  ing hy  dro-test”, where
lower  HEP  val ues  sig nif i cantly  pre vail.
· Man-in  duced LOCA in op  er  a  tion of WWER-440
re  ac  tors is the only sce  nario show  ing a rel  a  tively
good agree  ment among the to  tal val  ues of ab  so  -
lute  hu man  re lated  CDF  con tri bu tions  de rived  in
the in  di  vid  ual stud  ies; some level of agree  ment
can be found also in case of WWER-1000 sce  -
nario “Loss of heat re  moval via pri  mary side”.
· The  WWER-440  sce nario  “Re ac tiv ity  ac ci dents”  is
typ i cal with very high level of hu man fac tor in volve -
ment into the most im  por  tant MCS, which is very
close to unity or even equal to unity in most cases.
· The WWER-440 “Small LOCA” sce  nario shows
in sev  eral cases rel  a  tively low hu  man fac  tor con  -
tri  bu  tion to the risk of twenty of the most im  por  -
tant min  i  mum cut sets.
· Low rel a tive con tri bu tion to CDF is typ i cal for the
hu man role in the WWER-1000 sce nario “Loss of
off-site power”; the level of agree ment among the
val  ues pre  sented in the ta  ble for the in  di  vid  ual
PSAs is sur  pris  ingly high.
· In the WWER-1000 sce  nar  ios “Pri  mary cir  cuit
leaks out  side con  tain  ment” and “Small LOCA
from pri  mary to sec  ond  ary cir  cuit”, a very high
por  tion of MCS in  cludes pri  mary events con  tain  -
ing hu  man ac  tions, i. e. hu  man in  volve  ment is a
sub stan tial  con trib u tor  to  the  risk  pro file.
In gen  eral, it can be ob  served that the HEP val  -
ues ranges ex  plored in the WWER LPSD stud  ies pre  -
sented in the har  mo  ni  za  tion ef  fort, are driven by the
dif  fer  ences among HRA ap  proaches much more than
by  the  dif fer ences  among  the  in di vid ual  sce nar ios.
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ANALIZA  POUZDANOSTI  OSOBQA  U  OKVIRU  PROBABILISTI^KE
OCENE  SIGURNOSTI  NUKLEARNIH  POSTROJEWA  U  RE@IMU
MALIH  SNAGA  I  STAJAWA  VAN  POGONA
– Rezultati  jedne  me|unarodne  inicijative –
Od samog po~etka ere kori{}ewa nuklearne energije, qudski faktor je razmatran kao
jedan od kqu~nih aspekata u svim fazama `ivotnog ciklusa nuklearnog postrojewa: u projektovawu, 
pu{tawu u pogon, tokom pogona, odr`avawa, nadzora, pogonskih izmena i dekomisije. Ovakav stav
stalno se potvr|uje iskustvima iz prakse. Me|unarodna agencija za atomsku energiju i Udru`eni
istra`iva~ki centar Evropske komisije organizovali su radionicu na temu harmonizacije
probabilisti~kih analiza sigurnosti u re`imu malih snaga i stajawa van pogona za nuklearne
elektrane WWER tipa. Jedan od glavnih ciqeva radionice bio je da se izvr{i pore|ewe
razli~itih pristupa i rezultata analiza pouzdanosti osobqa kod nuklearnih elektrana tipa
WWER 440 i WWER 1000 i da se stekne uvid u budu}e primene analiza pouzdanosti osobqa u
razmatrawu scenarija u re`imu malih snaga i stajawa van pogona. Ovaj rad sumira aktivnosti i
zakqu~ke pomenute radionice koji se odnose na analize pouzdanosti osobqa i qudskog faktora.
Kqu~ne re~i: probabilisti~ka analiza sigurnosti, re`im malih snaga i stajawa van pogona,
.........................analiza pouzdanosti osobqa, WWER, qudski faktor